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THE WORLD TRADE CENTER-TERRORIST AIRLINE
DESTRUCTION: WILL THIS BE THE FIRST TEST OF
THE WAR BETWEEN THE MONTREAL LIABILITY
CONVENTION'S ARTICLE 21(2)(A) AND 21(2)(B)?
LARRY MooRE*
I. INTRODUCTIONO N SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ("9/11"), two commercial Boeing
767 airliners crashed into the World Trade Center. The
twin skyscrapers, which are among the architectural wonders of
the modern world, as well as symbols of the world's most power-
ful business district, came crashing down before the stunned
eyes of the world and in the process, destroyed a large part of
lower Manhattan.' At the same time, another commercial air-
liner crashed into the United States Pentagon, the center and
symbol of the world's mightiest military. The resulting deaths
were equal to that of Pearl Harbor and were twice that of the
Titanic.2
These were horrible disasters, vicious international crimes,
and acts of war of unprecedented and epic dimensions directed
against thousands of innocent, unsuspecting people going
about their daily lives. In terms of international law, these acts
reflect the kind of incidents that will be addressed by the new
Montreal Liability Convention, which was ratified in May 1999
by its Member States to replace the 70-year-old Warsaw Conven-
* B.A., Vanderbilt University; M.A., Memphis State University;J.D, Washington
University. Larry Moore is an Associate Professor at the Fogelman College of
Business at the University of Memphis.
I The details and knowledge of this event will be etched forever in the con-
scious of a generation, but for future references, one need only refer to the
archives of any general news source or database for the day September 12, 2001.
2 The current list of casualties shows a total of 3,065 dead: 2,841 were reported
dead or missing at the World Trade Center Towers, with 147 dead on the two
hijacked planes; at the Pentagon, 184 were reported dead or missing, with 59
dead on the hijacked plane. A Nation Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2002, at
A10.
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tion as the governing document for international commercial
aviation.-
This article, utilizing the 9/11 air crashes as examples, ana-
lyzes how the new international'commercial aviation agreement,
the Montreal Liability Convention, will determine and set mone-
tary damage limits for international passengers involved in air
crashes where third parties can be implicated in causing the
injuries.4
3 The "Warsaw System" collectively refers to the following instruments: Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11,
reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]; Pro-
tocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, opened for
signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol]; Conven-
tion Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other
Than the Contracting Carrier, opened for signature Sept. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Guadalajara Convention]; Protocol to Amend the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed
at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague
on 28 September 1955, openedfor signature Mar. 8,1971, 10 I.L.M. 613, ICAO Doc.
8932 [hereinafter Guatemala City Protocol 1971]; Additional Protocol No. 1 to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the
Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25,
1975, ICAO Doc. 9145 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 1]; Additional Proto-
col No. 2 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as
Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for
signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9146 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 2];
Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Oc-
tober 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September
1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 March 1971, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975,
ICAO Doc. 9147 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 3]; Additional Protocol No.
4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to In-
ternational Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended
by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for signature
Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in Sec. Rep. No. 105-20 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol
No. 4].
4 The Montreal Liability Agreement was immediately signed by 52 nations, in-
cluding the U.S., as the replacement document. See S. Doc. No. 106-45 (Montreal
Liability Agreement formally submitted to Senate for ratification on June 23,
2000). See also The Carriage by Air Acts (Implementation of the Montreal Con-
vention 1999) Order 2002, No. 263, available at http://vww.hmso.gov.uk/si/
si2002/20020263.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003); Air Carrier Liability in the Event of
Accidents, available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124169.htm
(detailing the European Council Regulation No. 2027/97 discussed on Oct. 9,
1997) (last visited Oct. 27, 2003). For discussion of the Montreal Liability Agree-
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II. HOW IS A DOMESTIC AIR CRASH GOVERNED BY
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
One of the more confusing aspects of international aviation
law is how cases of this nature can be governed by either the
Warsaw Convention or the Montreal Liability Convention.
None of the 9/11 flights used in the destruction of the World
Trade Center or the attack on Washington, D.C. were interna-
tional flights.
Under the Montreal Liability Convention and its predecessor
treaty, the Warsaw Convention, it is not where a flight
originated, ended, or crashed that determines the applicability
of international law, but whether the passenger is an interna-
tional traveler who is using the local flight as a part of his jour-
ney. Therefore, if a traveler takes a flight from England to
Boston, and then takes a flight from Boston to California, this
domestic part of the trip is governed by international law.It is unlikely that the rules governing this part of the treaty will
change under the Montreal Liability Convention as Article 1 of
the Montreal Liability Convention, which establishes the scope
of application, is almost identical to Article 1 of the Warsaw
Convention, except for some minor changes in wording5
ment, see generally Larry Moore, The New Montreal Liability Convention, Major
Changes in International Air Law: An End to the Warsaw Convention, 9 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 223 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, New Montreal Convention]; Larry Moore,
Domicile and the Death of the Warsaw System: The Revenge of Komlos, 19 WIs. INT'L LJ.
1 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Domicile].
5 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3. With regard to application of international
status, the Warsaw Treaty provides the following:
Article 1(2) For the purposes of this Convention, the expression
"international transportation shall mean any transportation in
which, according to the contract made by the parties the place of
departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a
break in the transportation or a transhipment, are situated either
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed
stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suze-
rainty, mandate or authority of another power, even if that power is
not a party to this convention. Transportation without such an
agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sover-
eignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another State is not in-
ternational carriage for the purposes authority of the same High
Contracting Party shall not be denied to be international;
(3) Transportation to be performed by several air successive carri-
ers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this convention, to be one
undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a
single operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form
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The case of Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. is a classic exam-
ple of the court's application of the language of the new treaty.6
In Egan, the plaintiff bought a round trip ticket to fly from New
York to Vancouver. Because of bad weather, the plaintiff could
not fly out of Vancouver, so she cashed in her ticket, took a bus
to Seattle and bought a new ticket to New York. The plane
crashed while trying to land in New York.7 The court held that
the plaintiffs claim was still governed by the international treaty
even though she was an American who bought a ticket on an
entirely domestic flight within the U.S.8
In light of the Egan holding, the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Liability Convention would apply on a case-by-case ba-
sis to any 9/11 airline passenger who was traveling to or from
the United States. A quick analysis of passengers coming into
the U.S. shows that each flight would yield at least one interna-
tional case.9 Indeed, in today's world of international business
of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall not lose
its international character merely because one contract or a series
of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to
the same sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same
High Contracting Party.
Compare with the Montreal Liability Agreement, which provides the following:
Article 1(2) For the purposes of this Convention, the expression
international carriage means any carriage in which, according to
the agreement made between the parties, the place of departure
and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the
carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories
of two State Parties, or within the territory of a single State Party if
there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another
State, even if that State is not a State Party. Carriage between two
points within the territory of a single state party without an agreed
stopping place within the territory of another state is not interna-
tional carriage for the purposes of this Convention
(3) Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers is
deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided
carriage if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation,
whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a single con-
tract or of a series of contracts, and it does not lose its international
character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to
be performed entirely within the territory of the same State.
6 Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 234 N.E.2d 199 (N.Y. 1967). Although
this case has since received negative treatment, it reflects the court's analysis
prior to the ratification of the Montreal Liability Agreement.
7 Id. at 200-01.
8 Id.
9 Passengers traveling into the U.S. from other nations.
AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 11
Albert Dominguez, 66, Sydney, Australia
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and travel, it would be hard to imagine any air crash by a large
commercial airliner not yielding at least one case that would be
governed by international law.
III. LIABILITY LIMITS AND INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION LAW
The old Warsaw Convention, which regulated international
commercial aviation from 1929 until 1999,1" was a problem for
the United States because it set comparatively low monetary
awards for personal injury or death resulting from an interna-
tional air flight accident when compared to the damages recov-
ered for the same types of injuries sustained in the very same air
accident by those U.S. passengers traveling only domestically.1'
Under Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the total dam-
ages allowed were 125,000 Poincare francs 2 or $8,300." The
United States eliminated the opportunity for inflation adjust-
ments when it abandoned the gold standard even though gold
was the official treaty standard for determining the value of the
franc, and hence through the currency exchange rate, the dol-
Waleed Iskandar, 34, London, England
AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77
Yvonne Kennedy, 62, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Shuyin Yang, 61, Beijing, China
Yuguag Zheng, 65, Beijing, China
UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175
Alona Avraham, 30, Ashdot, Israel
Klaus Bothe, 31, Linkenheim, Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany
Ana Gloria Pocasangre de Barrera, 49, El Salvador
Heinrich Kimmig, 43, Willstaett, Germany
Wolfgang Peter Menzel, 59, Wilhelmshaven, Germany
UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93
Christian Adams, 37, Biebelsheim, Germany
Toshiya Kuge, 20, Nishimidoriguoska, Japan
10 Moore, Domicile, supra note 4, at 1.
II See Andreas Lowenfeld & Allan Mendelsohn, The U.S. and the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 504-05 (1967).
12 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3. Article 22 of the Warsaw Treaty provides:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier
for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the car-
rier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Compare to the terms of the Montreal Liability Agreement in Article 21.
1 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 499.
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lar.14 As a result of this, the damage limits in dollars have been
frozen at the last official United States gold to dollar exchange
rate set in 1958.'1 Because of the low amount of recovery with
no adjustments for inflation,' 6 legal and judicial gymnastics were
developed to avoid the treaty liability limits by the courts of the
United States.' 7
The treaty was amended and modified over the years at sev-
eral different conferences and meetings.' 8 Almost all of these
were to appease the United States' objections to the low liability
limits.'9 Until the new Montreal Liability Convention, the
United States had accepted only one of these modifications as
14 See Rene Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diversification of Uniform Private Law Conven-
tions: The Warsaw Convention's Days in Court, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 718, 719
(1972).
1-5 Moore, New Montreal Convention, supra note 4 (discussing Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 446 U.S. 243, 248 (1984), where the Court left
the value of the treaty at about $8,700 because of the gold exchange rate at the
time, and up from $8,200 at the time the treaty was enacted).
'6 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 22. Under Article 22(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, the total damages allowed were 125,000 Poincare francs or
$8,300.
17 See Larry Moore, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.: The United States Supreme Court
Eliminates the American Rule to the Warsaw Convention, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 229, 230-31 (1990). In Chan, the Supreme Court eliminated the" Ameri-
can Rule in its interpretation of the Warsaw Convention. This rule set aside the
limits of the treaty if the required warning on the ticket was set in a print size that
was smaller than 10 point type.
18 Id. at 232-33.
19 For a discussion of the major rulings that shaped the Warsaw Convention in
the United States since 1988 and helped lead to the Montreal Liability Conven-
tion, see Moore, supra note 17 and text; Larry Moore, Mental Injury and Lesion
Corporelle in International Aviation Under the Warsaw Convention: Eastern Airlines v.
Hoyd, 22 ACAD. OF LEGAL STUD. IN Bus. NAT'L PROC. 504, 508-10 (1993) (discuss-
ing Eastern case, in which the Supreme Court rejected mental or psychic injury as
an independent ground for recovering damages inder the Warsaw Convention);
Larry Moore, The Lockerbie Air Disaster: Punitive Damages in International Aviation,
15 Hous. J. INT'L L. 67 (1992) (discussing Second Circuit ruling which brought
the Court of Appeals into uniformity when it held that punitive damages could
not be allowed inder the Convention where the sole cause of action was for
international air accidents); Larry Moore, Air Disasters: Causes of Action in Interna-
tional Aviation Under the Warsaw Convention: Buying the Ghost of Komlos, 2 J. OF
LEGAL STUD. IN Bus. (1993) (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's holding reaffirm-
ing the rule that the treaty provides the only cause of action in international air
accidents) [hereinafter Moore, Air Disasters]; see also LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH,
THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK (Kluwer Academic
Publishers 1988).
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marginally acceptable. 20 However, that modification was not an
official governmental treaty modification, but was a private
agreement, reached in Montreal among the major commercial
airlines, in which these companies agreed to strict liability for
any international aviation accident and to an increase in liability
limits to $75,000.21 This agreement kept the United States in
the Warsaw system for the last thirty-four years, however in retro-
spect, this agreement was probably illegal because the treaty
barred any liability changes by contract as this agreement, in
fact, created.22
On October 31, 1995, under the direction and promotion of
the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) and
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Inter-
national Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the War-
saw Convention was adopted by the members of these two
international business and academic aviation organizations at
Kuala Lumpur and presented to Member States of the Warsaw
Convention for consideration. 23 After several years of discus-
sion, negotiations, and modifications, it was ratified and for-
mally went into effect on May 28, 1999 as the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air.24
When ratified by a Member State, the new treaty will replace the
20 Larry Moore & Stephen P. Ferris, Air Disasters and Their Financial Effects on the
International Aviation Industry:Justification for the Warsaw Convention?, 4J. OF LEGAL
STUD. IN Bus. 107, 108-11 (1995).
21 Id at 111.
22 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3. This section bars the members of the
treaty from changing the law to be applied in advanced by contract, which would
have included the law governing damages. The Montreal Agreement does ex-
actly that.
Article 32 of the Warsaw Convention provides in part:
Any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements en-
tered into before the damage occurred by which the parties pur-
port to infringe the rules laid down by this convention, whether by
deciding the law to be applied, or by altering the rules as tojurisdic-
tion, shall be null and void...
23 Ludwig Weber & Arie Jakob, Current Developments Concerning the Reform of the
Warsaw System, 21 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 301, 304 (1996).
24 Montreal Convention, supra note 3; see also supra text accompanying note 5;
Sung Hwan Shin, The Warsaw System: Liability and the Common Interest, 22 ANN. AIR
& SPACE L. 261 (1997). See the text of the IATA antecedent agreement to the
Montreal Liability Agreement, IATA Inter-Carrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, 21
ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 293-95 (1996).
After much consultation with the United States, this country became an official
party to the new agreement in 1997 by Department of Transportation [DOT]
Order 97-1-2. A new formal document was then drafted and executed to govern
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Warsaw treaty for that nation. On the other hand, a nation who
does not ratify it and is a Member State of the Warsaw Conven-
tion will continue to be governed by the Warsaw Convention.
The most controversial changes in the Montreal Convention are
the new monetary damage recovery laws, which supersede those
in the Warsaw Convention.25
The most striking thing about the new Montreal Liability Con-
vention is that it completely changes the basis for damage claims
and the liability limits to be employed. 26 This Convention estab-
lishes a two-tiered recovery system for death or injuries arising
from an international air accident. 27 The first tier is created by
21(1), which raises the limit from its Warsaw System/Montreal
Convention limits of $75,000 for the developed nations whose
airlines signed the Montreal Agreement, and from approxi-
this agreement, was approved for ratification for member nations, and was called
the Montreal Liability Agreement on May 28, 1999.
25 Robert F. Hedrick, The New Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability: Is It a
Wrong Step in the Right Direction?, 21 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 135, 151-52 (1996).
26 Moore, New Montreal Convention, supra note 4, at 227-29. See Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 3; but cf Montreal Convention, supra note 3.
Article 21 of the Montreal Liability Convention provides the following:
Compensation in Case of Death or Injury of Passengers. 1. For
damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 not exceeding 100
000 Special Drawing Rights for each passenger, the carrier shall not
be able to exclude or limit its liability. 2. The carrier shall not be
liable for damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 to the
extent that they exceed for each passenger 100 000 Special Draw-
ing Rights if the carrier proves that:
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrong-
ful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents; or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of a third party.
When Article 21(1) & 21(2) are taken together, the result is that there are no
limits on damages allowed under Article 17 of the Treaty if negligence is proven.
Section 2 merely shifts the burden of proof onto the airline to show that there
was no negligence. Otherwise, negligence will be presumed and higher damage
awards could follow automatically. Thus, a negligence claim under the Montreal
Liability Convention would yield the same resulting damages as would an ordi-
nary negligence claim anywhere else.
This in effect operates as a revocation of the governing principle
behind the Warsaw Convention, which was to set a definite amount
for damages so that any passenger traveling pursuant to the Warsaw
System would know what he would be entitled to before an acci-
dent. Further, the new Convention totally eliminates the Article
25(1) principle of the Warsaw Treaty which only allowed unlimited
damages if the airline was guilty of willful misconduct. What we
now have is the American System applied internationally.
27 Id. Moore, New Montreal Convention, supra note 4, at 227-29.
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mately $8,700 for many of the other treaty nations, to approxi-
mately $145,000 or 100,000 Special Drawing Rights, or "SDR's"
for all Member States. 28 The air carrier is also subject to strict
liability for this firsttier amount as was the case in the old Mon-
treal Agreement.29
The second tier of recovery is created under 21(2) if the dam-
ages sought are above the initial amount of 100,000 SDR's 3 0
Higher amounts can be awarded under 21(2) if the plaintiff al-
leges negligence by the air carrier3 1 and that carrier does not
rebut it.3 2 This will result in unlimited recovery for actual
damages. 3
Any potential World Trade Center litigation for injuries
caused by terrorists to any international traveler under the Mon-
treal Liability Convention would raise conflicting theories of liti-
gation because of the provisions contained within Article 21 (2).
Under Article 21(2) (a), the plaintiffs will be attempting to ne-
gate any defense by the airlines to show that they were not negli-
gent in allowing the hijackers to board. 4 Therefore, the airlines
will attempt to limit their liability under article 21(2) (b) because
it relieves them of any damages beyond the Article 21 (1) limits if
they can show that the injury was caused by third parties.3 5 This
re-opens the question that was examined in earlier civil trials for
damage limits in cases involving terrorist activity. 36
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORIST
AIRLINE ATTACKS
A. AIRPORT ATT-rACKS
Under the old Warsaw Convention, the test for determining
when injury or damage was caused by terrorist activity was set
forth in the case of Day v. Trans World Airlines.37 The facts in Day
occurred at the airport in Athens, Greece." Here, travelers had
28 Id.
29 Id. See also Ludwig Weber, ICAO's Initiative to Reform the Legal Framework for
Air Carrier Liability, 22 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 59, 62 (1997).
3o Weber, supra note 29, at 62.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Moore, New Montreal Convention, supra note 4, at 226.
34 Id. at 227-29.
35 Id.
36 Moore, Air Disasters, supra note 19.
37 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
38 Id. at 32.
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to go first through a passport check area and then down into the
passenger lounge." From there, they were called and directed
to the departure gate where they were searched and their bag-
gage was inspected by Greek police.40 The attack occurred
while the passengers were standing in line to be searched, prior
to boarding the airplane. Two terrorists got through all of the
searches with weapons,4 threw hand grenades into the line of
passengers, and then sprayed the crowd with gunfire. 42 The ex-
plosions and gunfire killed three travelers and wounded 40
others.4 -
The court held that the test for determining carrier liability
required analysis of three factors: (1) activity of the plaintiffs,
(2) control over the plaintiffs, and (3) location of the plain-
tiffs. 44 The court found that at the time of the attack, the pas-
sengers were (1) in a location required by the airlines for
security searches prior to boarding, 45 (2) engaged in passenger
identification and clearance, 46 and (3) not free agents who
could roam at will through the terminal, but instead were under
the direction of the airline's agents.4 7 For these reasons, the
court found the airline to be liable.48
The court rejected the notion that liability attached to an air-
line under the Convention simply because a passenger entered
an airport. 49 However, because of the additional security re-
quirements, the court held that the airline would be responsible
for passengers while they were engaged in the security aspect of
the boarding process because of the airline's economic power
over the airport and because the airline was in the best position
to persuade the airports to provide the necessary and adequate
safety precautions needed to protect international passengers,






44 Id. at 33.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 32.
41 Id. at 33-34.
4,. Id. at 35.
50 See id.
708
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However, in Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 1 the court,
in a case similar in many ways to Day, ruled in favor of the air-
line. In Buonocore, passengers in the Rome airport waiting for a
flight to New York were the victims of a terrorist attack. 52 Ter-
rorists invaded the airport, hurled hand grenades, and fired into
the crowd with machine guns. 53 The deceased plaintiff was one
of 16 people killed in the attack. 54 This case was distinguishable
from Day in that the passengers were not lined up under the
care and control of the airlines prior to the attack.55 The court
found that because the passengers were not yet under the com-
plete control of the airlines, were not making preparations for
boarding, were hours from departing, and were not physically
near the gate, the airline was not liable.56 In this case, security
was entirely the responsibility of the airport.57
These cases established the limits of the airlines' responsibility
in providing security for their passengers, and pointed out that
in some instances, the question of passenger security is solely
the responsibility of the airport.
B. IN-FLIGHT ATTACKS
In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland was a case that arose out
of an in-flight terrorist bombing that blew apart a Pan Am flight
from London to New York over Lockerbie, Scotland. 58 The
plaintiffs argued that under Article 25 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, all liability limits should be removed for the willful miscon-
duct of the airlines in permitting the injuries to occur by
allowing the bomb to be slipped on board.59 Note that the argu-
ments accepted by the court to prove willful misconduct and to
remove the liability limits were similar, if not identical, to the
51 Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990); see
also Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (arising out
of the same attack but denying liability under the Warsaw Convention).
52 Buonocore, 900 F.2d at 9.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 10.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 10-11.
58 Id. In reAir Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267,
1269 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Lockerbie 1].
59 In reAir Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 736 F. Supp. 18,
19 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) [hereinafter Lockerbie I].
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normal requirements to prove common negligence.60 The
courts of the United States had a long tendency under the old
treaty to allow proof of negligence to be substituted as proof of
willful injury arguments as a means of circumventing the liability
limits of the treaty in the United States.61 However, under the
Montreal Liability Convention, negligence is the standard for re-
moving these limits. 62
In Ospina v. Trans World Airlines,63 a bomb exploded on a
TWA flight as it approached the airport in Athens, Greece on
April 2, 1986.64 Though it killed four passengers, wounded
others, and blew a large hole in the fuselage, the airplane man-
aged to land safely with the survivors of the blast.65 The plain-
tiffs charged the airline with willful misconduct in permitting
the bomb to be hidden on board.66 The court ruled that while
the airline did not utilize all known procedures, this probably
still would not have uncovered the bomb.6 7 The court ruled
that a simple omission by the airline would not be sufficient to
raise the airline's actions to the level of willful misconduct. 61
Here, the court strictly applied the recovery limit and did not
permit negligence to be recast as willful misconduct.69 Thus,
this decision recognized that skillful third parties could some-
times get past the system through no fault of the carrier.
In Lockerbie III, the court cited Ospina but did not follow it."0
Instead, it accepted the plaintiffs evidence, which tended to
60 Lockerbie I, 928 F.2d at 1269, rev'd in part on other grounds. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: RECKLESS DISREGARD OF SAFETY DEFINED § 500 (2003).
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to
realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is neces-
sary to make his conduct negligent.
61 See generally Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Liability for Personal Injury and Death
Under the Warsaw Convention and Its Relevance to Fault Liability in Tort Law, 21 ANN.
AIR & SPACE L. 1 (1996).
62 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, ICAO Doc. 9740.





68 Id. at 37.
- See id.
70 In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1998, 37 F.3d 804, 812
(2d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Lockerbie III].
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show negligence, and decided that it proved willful miscon-
duct. 7 ' The case also raised the question of what constituted
correct actions by the airline in protecting its passengers from
the actions of third parties.
At trial, the plaintiffs' position was that the defendant's bag-
gage handling and inspection procedure was not effective in
protecting the passengers of the airplane. 72 Because of this de-
fective procedure, a terrorist was able to hide a bomb in a suit-
case and smuggle it on board the airplane.73
The defendant's proof was that the airline's security proce-
dures were in compliance with British security regulations74 and
that the security risk of unaccompanied luggage was relatively
low. 7 5 However, the trial court excluded this evidence and the
court of appeals held that this was harmless error. 76 This case,
once again, opens up the question of what constitutes adequate
protection under international law in airport screening of pas-
sengers and their luggage. This remains an open question
under the new Montreal Convention.
V. WORLD TRADE CENTER/PENTAGON: NEGLIGENCE
OR THIRD PARTY ACTION?
A. INTRODUCTION
Under the Montreal Convention, plaintiffs now no longer
have to take acts of ordinary negligence and somehow convert
them into the equivalent of a reckless or intentional act. How-
ever, the question that will be key in analyzing any international
aviation passenger case that might arise out of the World Trade
Center tragedies is whether, in spite of the enormity of the pain,
injury and damage done, the airline was a negligent actor or just
another victim of the activities of the hijackers.
B. INEFFECTIVE SECURITY INSPECTIONS
Prospective plaintiffs would rely on Article 21(2) (a) of the
Montreal Convention, and argue that the defendants were negli-
gent in allowing passengers to get on board with box cutters,
71 Id. at 820; see alsoJuan E. Acosta, Willful Misconduct Under the Warsaw Conven-
tion: Recent Trends and Developments, 19 U. OF MIAMI L. REv. 575 (1965).
72 Lockerbie III, 37 F.3d at 820.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 821.
76 Id. at 822.
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which were used to attack passengers and kill crew members,
thus creating the opportunity for terrorist pilots to take over the
airplane and crash them into pre-chosen targets. This argument
would be bolstered by the current popular conception, which
holds that, had the box cutters been detected, the tragedies
could have been avoided. The belief that the safety inspections
were defective has led to a public outcry for tighter airport se-
curity, and Congress has responded by federalizing airport se-
curity operations.77 Under this argument, the airlines would be
considered negligent in that they permitted third parties, the
terrorists, to take over the airplanes in the first place. Prospec-
tive plaintiffs would further argue that this negligence caused
the resulting injury or death.
C. Too EFFICIENT SECURITY INSPECTIONS
The defendant airlines would rely on Article 21 (2) (b) of the
Montreal Convention, and argue that third party terrorists were
the cause of the injuries, not the airline procedures. However,
the defendants' case would be far more intricate and novel than
that required of the plaintiff. That is, the defendants' proof
would show that the terrorist takeover of the airlines was a well-
planned, paramilitary-type action that actually took advantage of
the efficiencies of the United States' airline inspections and of
its cultural expectations.
The terrorists knew that the United States' screening tech-
niques would effectively screen out everything Americans con-
sidered to be dangerous weapons, such as the machine guns and
hand grenades used in the Day case. The terrorists knew that
Americans are fixated on guns, bombs, grenades, and military
knives in their idea of what constitutes dangerous weapons.
Thus, kitchen knives, scissors, hair pins, nail clippers, etc., are
generally considered harmless in American society. Our grade
school children regularly use scissors in home and school activi-
ties. Hence, the hijackers knew that even if security inspectors
saw these small, innocuous looking blades, they would consider
them to be tools, not weapons, and would permit them on
board. The hijackers also knew that once aboard, they would be
the only armed individuals on the aircraft, as the American se-
77 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 107 Pub. L. No.
42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot
Act), 107 Pub. L. No. 56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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curity system would have filtered out any weapon that could
have been used against them. Thus, the hijackers knew that
with surprise, any object, even one with a dull blade such as a
plastic knife, would make them the only armed parties on the
airplane.
The terrorists combined the above tendencies with the west-
ern practice of cooperating with hijackers in the belief that ne-
gotiating and military tactics would ultimately rescue the
hostages. The terrorists knew that this cultural reflex would
mean that the passengers and remaining crew would permit
them to fly the planes into their targets, with the belief that they
were being diverted elsewhere for negotiations.
The defendants' 21(2) (b) defense would essentially be that
the essence of negligence is foreseeability, and that few Ameri-
cans before September 11, 2001, would have foreseen that box
cutters, with their half-inch blades and plastic knives, would be
used as weapons to take over an airliner. In addition, before
that day, Americans would never expect that an airliner, once
hijacked, would be used as a human-controlled guided missile of
destruction. Indeed, the terrorists knew what many Americans,
with their many safety rules, laws, and equipment, have forgot-
ten: a human is remarkably easy to kill, even with a plastic
knife.78
It is one of the bitter ironies of this attack that the terrorists
depended on the current security system doing its job of guaran-
teeing that there were no standard weapons on board, while per-
mitting items that Americans have long ceased to think of as
weapons to come on board. Based on the cultural standards at
that time, no legislation or security methods, even if in effect at
the time of the World Trade Center attack, would have kept
items like box cutters, letter openers, or metal rulers and the
like, off the doomed airplanes. These laws would also not have
78 This writer has delivered a series of lectures and written papers on how our
technology was not only used against us in the "9/11" attack, but so too was also
our common cultural expectations of what is dangerous and what is not was used
to our disadvantage. I did this with a simple demonstration. I pretended to be a
terrorist dressed as an ordinary business person who has been screened for weap-
ons. Then, as a volunteer acting as a flight attendant turned her back, I took off
my necktie and demonstrated a garrote strangulation of the attendant and then
used my ink pen to show how to slash the throat of a passenger. At each demon-
stration the new awareness of how much our feeling of safety is influenced by
what we perceive flashed over the audience. What we view as a weapon and what
we see as harmless is determined more by our attitudes toward an object than the
object itself.
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prevented the passengers from cooperating with the hijackers
once they had taken control of the airplane.
1. Hijackings Prior to 9/11
Based upon the previous actions and pattern of extremist
Arab terrorists, most western safety officials would have pre-
sumed that the plane would have landed safely, right up until
the moment that the first Boeing 767 crashed into the north
tower of the World Trade Center. This is illustrated by the fol-
lowing history of aviation hijackings prior to September 11.
In Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Islamic terrorists hijacked a
TWA airliner while in the air from Frankfurt, Germany to New
York on September 6, 1970.0 The plane was diverted to a
Jordanian desert where the victims were released on September
13, 1970.81
In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., also on September 6, 1970,
a flight from Zurich, Switzerland, bound to New York was hi-
jacked shortly after take off and diverted to the same desert in
Jordan.82 These passengers too were held until September 11
and released on September 12.
The case of In re Hijacking of Pan American World Airways Air-
craft at Karachi International Airport4 arose out of a Pan Am flight
from Bombay, India to New York City, which was hijacked at
Karachi, Pakistan. 5 Twenty people were killed, and a number
79 Many in the Islamic world trace the decline of Islam as the dominant relig-
ion and the ascendance of Christianity and western culture to the battle for Vi-
enna in 1683. On July 5, 1683, Sultan Kara Mustafa, taking advantage of the feud
between Protestants and Catholics, moved to conquer all of Europe by marching
an army of 250,000 soldiers before the gates of Vienna. Mustafa then proceeded,
through siege warfare, to crash down the walls. Only days before the collapse of
the city, 26,000 Polish troops arrived on September 5, 1683, and joined with
18,000 troops from other parts of Germany to form an army of 60,000. On the
night of September 11, they attacked the surprised Turks who had established no
defenses whatsoever. By the end of September 12, the Turkish army fled, and
with it, the zenith of the Ottoman Empire. Some Islamic terrorists or liberation
groups have seen attacks on this day as the beginning of a new zenith.
WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF Louis XIV 423-24 (1963).
80 Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829 (N.Y. App. Div.
1970).
81 Id.
82 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
83 Id.
84 In re Hijacking of Pan Am. World Aircraft at Karachi Int'l Airport, 729 F.
Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
85 Id. at 18.
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1715of passengers were injured.6 The trial court removed all dam-age limits because of the actions of the airline, notwithstanding
the intervening actions of the terrorist.87
The Karachi hijacking occurred on September 5, 1986, but en-ded shortly afterward in a shootout before the plane was com-pletely commandeered.S Still, it occurred during theSeptember 5 to September 12 period, which Islamic hijackersseem to favor. Thus, based on the historic behavior of the hi-jackers prior to the 9/11 hijackings, a reasonable person wouldnot have anticipated anything more in the 2001 hijacking thanthe actions of the previous instances, none of which foreshad-owed the use of a passenger plane as a Kamikaze weapon.
VI. CONCLUSION
The main issues from the Montreal Liability Convention casesfrom the World Trade Center disaster will be whether the secur-ity measures utilized by the airlines were negligent causes of theaccident, or whether the skill of the terrorists in overriding thesecurity system and the terrorists' unexpected actions relievedthe airline of liability. Negligence requires proof of what a rea-sonable person within a culture perceives a risk or a hazard tobe. In this case, our culture did not see small blades as a threat,and it saw cooperating with hijackers as a safety precaution.Whatever the result of any future litigation, expectations aboutwhat is dangerous and what is not, as well as how to respond toan airline hijacking, will never be the same.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Pan Am. Suspends Rights to Pakistan over Airport Security, TORONTO STAR, Sept.
9, 1986, at A3.
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